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FOREWORD
Football activities, both on and off the pitch, are often hitting our news.  Despite 
remarkable revenue growth we have seen numerous well known clubs facing 
an escalation of player costs, unsustainable debt and clubs suffering financial 
difficulties, sometimes leading to insolvency proceedings.  This has resulted 
in European football’s governing body – UEFA – taking action and introducing 
Financial Fair Play (FFP) regulations.  These regulations are designed to encourage 
clubs to adopt a more economically rational and sustainable approach to their 
activities.  But will these regulations work and what is the impact on financial 
reporting for clubs – is the current framework fit for purpose?
This report seeks to address these issues through a series of interviews with 
finance directors at football clubs, football club auditors, football finance experts and 
representatives of governing bodies and leagues.
The new regulations, effective for 2013/14, essentially require clubs ‘playing in 
Europe’ to report a break-even position, over a rolling period but based on what 
is termed ‘relevant’ income and costs.  There is also a monitoring of overdue 
payables.
Whilst this study is largely supportive of UEFA’s objectives, a number of specific 
concerns were raised by the interviewees, leading to three recommendations for 
UEFA to consider: the need for more emphasis on cash control measures; that 
sanctions should not be financial in nature; and the need to reconsider the risk that 
sanctioned clubs might suffer some form of double jeopardy.
The current financial statements produced by clubs were seen as of little or no use, 
and there was little agreement amongst the interviewees as to whether this would 
change as a result of FFP.  One specific recommendation is that clubs disclose their 
break-even calculations and also reconcile these to the reported profit or loss in the 
financial statements.  Tied in with wider debates on improving financial reporting 
and the development of integrated reporting it is also suggested that a leading 
football club participates in an integrated reporting pilot study. 
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This project was funded by the Scottish Accountancy Trust for Education and 
Research (SATER – see page 71). The Research Committee of ICAS has also been 
pleased to support this project. The Committee recognises that the views expressed 
do not necessarily represent those of ICAS itself, but hopes that the results of this 
research will be of interest to those involved in the industry, ICAS members and the 
wider public and useful to UEFA in its appraisal of FFP. 
Allister Wilson
Convener of ICAS Research Committee
May 2014
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
While economies, industries and companies throughout Europe have struggled in 
recent years, major European football leagues and clubs have continued to see 
remarkable revenue growth; fuelled by domestic and overseas media rights. Too 
often, however, that revenue growth has not led to profit, with many clubs reporting 
substantial losses and escalating debts and several high profile clubs suffering 
insolvency events. The seemingly paradoxical situation in European football finance 
- increasing revenues but declining financial performance and position - has now 
directly influenced football policy; most visibly in the introduction by The Union of 
European Football Associations (UEFA) of Financial Fair Play (FFP) regulations 
designed to encourage clubs to adopt a more economically rational and sustainable 
approach to their activities. An overview of these regulations is provided below:
•	 They	apply	to	all	clubs	which	meet	a	minimum	threshold	in	terms	of	income	and	
expenditure and which wish to be licensed to participate in UEFA’s Europe-wide 
club competitions.
•	 The	key	requirement	is	that	clubs	should	report	a	break-even	position	(subject	to	
an acceptable level of deviation) over a rolling three year period.
•	 In	determining	break-even	clubs	need	only	include	what	are	defined	as	‘relevant	
income’ and ‘relevant costs’ - at its simplest clubs must match football-related 
expenditure with football-related income.
•	 They	are	effective	from	2013/14	but	based	on	clubs’	financial	results	from	
season 2011/12 onwards.
•	 They	include	requirements	on	the	monitoring	of	overdue	payables	(to	other	clubs,	
players and tax authorities).
Whilst the majority of British football clubs continue be to be structured as limited 
liability companies, these organisations operate within a financial and sporting 
structure which is governed and controlled by separate economic entities such as 
leagues. As a result clubs are obliged to co-operate with their competitors to jointly 
produce individual matches and competitions, which in turn results in a degree of 
dependency, sporting and financial, between those clubs. However, the very nature 
of sporting competition means that inevitably there will be many more losers than 
winners. Hence, in pursuit of sporting success, few clubs are uninfluenced by 
the behaviour and decision-making of their competitors; and the decision-making 
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would often be considered irrational if viewed from a conventional economic or 
financial perspective. At the same time, there is widespread public and media 
interest and scrutiny of the business of football clubs, although paradoxically this 
arises more from their social importance than their financial significance. These are 
organisations which often have highly engaged stakeholders; individuals and groups 
which have unambiguous expectations in terms of the accountability (including 
financial accountability) expected from their club and its directors. Despite these 
significant organisational and governance differences, the financial statements 
that football clubs prepare, and through which clubs seek to demonstrate their 
accountability, are no different from those prepared by any other limited liability 
company. 
Study approach
The study was based on interviews, in which the opinions of professional 
accountants and others with experience of working in and around the business side 
of football clubs were sought, on the following issues: 
•	 The	requirements	set	out	in	UEFA’s	FFP	regulations.
•	 The	usefulness	of	conventional	financial	reporting	for	professional	football	clubs.
•	 The	implications	of	FFP	for	football	club	financial	reporting	and	as	to	whether	
alternative forms of reporting may better communicate the value and role of 
contemporary football clubs. 
Interviews were held with: finance directors at clubs in England and Scotland; 
representatives of clubs’ auditors; football finance experts working in the 
profession; and representatives of governing bodies and leagues. 
Key findings and policy implications
FFP requirements
The rationale and need for enhanced financial regulation of football clubs was 
widely accepted by interviewees. There was considerable support for the FFP 
approach adopted by UEFA and for the adoption of the rolling break-even 
performance measure. The determination of relevant income and costs was 
welcomed by many interviewees as a way of encouraging or incentivising long-
term planning and decision-making by clubs. 
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The enhanced rules on the monitoring of overdue payables were universally 
welcomed. But notwithstanding the indirect relationship between such monitoring 
and cash, there was widespread concern that the regulations placed insufficient 
emphasis on cash, something seen as fundamental to the business of football 
clubs. This concern is highlighted by the number of clubs in respect of which 
auditors have regularly expressed concern about the validity of the going concern 
assumption.
The primary concern which emerged out of the interviews, however, centred 
on UEFA’s willingness and capacity to enforce its regulations given the political 
and economic context of professional football and the implications of regulatory 
enforcement, sporting and financial. 
Other concerns identified included: 
•		the	logic	of	using	financial	fines	as	penalties	in	a	regulatory	system	designed	to	
improve the financial capability of clubs; 
•		the	risks	that	a	sanctioned	club	may	in	practice	be	punished	more	than	once	for	
its offence; 
•		the	creation	of	multiple	financial	performance	measures;	
•	 UEFA’s	capacity	and	competence	around	technical	issues,	such	as	fair	value	and	
related parties, and related issues of enforcement;
•	 that	the	rules	and	detailed	guidance	will	encourage	clubs	to	seek	loopholes	in	the	
rules so that they are complying with the letter but not the spirit of FFP;
•		the	risk	of	creative	accounting	around	the	definitions	of	relevant	income,	relevant	
costs and fair value; and 
•		the	risk	that	the	regulations	may	limit	inward	investment.
UEFA has indicated that it sees FFP as a work in progress and that it welcomes 
feedback and critical appraisal. While there is much in this report that is 
supportive of UEFA’s high level objectives and of its detailed rules, three policy 
recommendations emerge for the organisation from this study.
As UEFA reviews the implementation and effectiveness of FFP, it is recommended 
that:
•		Greater	consideration	be	afforded	in	the	regulations	to	cash	control	measures.
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•		FFP	enforcement	sanctions	adopted	are	not	financial	in	nature.
•		Further	consideration	is	given	as	to	how	UEFA	might	amend	its	regulations	to	
avoid a sanctioned club suffering a form of double jeopardy.
Role and usefulness of financial statements
The introduction of FFP has not only illuminated weakness in the operating 
behaviour of some football clubs, but also inadequacies in the reporting and 
communication of their activities. The evidence from this study suggests that 
financial reporting in football clubs is largely compliance driven; a statutory 
necessity providing some limited assurance to some accounts users, such as 
suppliers, lenders and governing bodies/leagues, but offering little meaningful 
disclosure on key performance indicators like salary costs and little evident 
benefit in terms of decision-making and wider accountability. Given the financial 
performance and position reported in so many clubs’ financial statements, the 
level of assurance provided is questionable - something recognised by UEFA in 
its decision to introduce FFP. The limitations of conventional historical financial 
statements, coupled with peculiarities in the financial and ownership structure of 
many football clubs, result in annual reports being of little or no use as decision-
making tools.
It is recommended that:
•	 Research	is	undertaken	into	the	merits	and	demerits	of	introducing	bespoke	
financial reporting for football clubs, taking into consideration the distinct nature 
of football club organisations and their stakeholders.
Implications for financial reporting
By focusing attention on longer-term time horizons, on the inter-dependence of 
football clubs and on the social and political context within which professional 
football takes place, FFP has drawn attention to the limitations of relying solely 
on conventional financial performance measures. However, there was no 
consensus among interviewees as to whether the introduction of FFP was likely 
to have implications for football club financial reporting. Some interviewees 
saw FFP purely as a necessary regulatory process and as such unlikely to have 
any discernible impact on reporting. In the view of these interviewees, the very 
competitive environment within which clubs exist coupled with the high levels of 
scrutiny, would result in clubs being unwilling to disclose more than was absolutely 
9 FINANCIAL FAIR PLAY - IMPLICATIONS FOR FOOTBALL CLUB FINANCIAL REPORTING
necessary. Other interviewees, however, believed that the financial consequences 
of FFP coupled with media and stakeholder interest therein could result in it 
being a first step towards enhanced disclosure; in particular in terms of the FFP 
break-even calculation but also around other key performance measures such as 
player salaries. From a different perspective, concern was also expressed about 
inconsistency between FFP break-even and ‘actual’ financial viability. The possibility 
that in time FFP might encourage broader football club reporting, a greater 
emphasis on the multi-faceted nature of football clubs’ contribution and value, and 
on providing improved accountability to stakeholders was not widely accepted by 
interviewees. 
Nevertheless, the specificities of this sector mean that football clubs are well placed 
to contribute to a wider debate about the nature of financial reporting. Hence, two 
further policy recommendations are offered; the first specific to football clubs and 
FFP; the second of more generic interest:
•	 As	FFP	break-even	regulations	begin	to	take	effect,	consideration	is	given	by	
UEFA, leading European clubs and their advisers to the benefits of disclosing 
the FFP break-even measure and to requiring clubs to provide a reconciliation 
between it and reported profit/(loss). As well as providing enhanced disclosure, 
this would lessen the risk of stakeholders being misled by differences between 
FFP break-even and ‘actual’ financial viability. 
•	 That	the	International	Integrated	Reporting	Council	(IIRC),	ICAS	and	other	
interested parties seek to identify a leading football club willing to participate in 
an integrated reporting pilot/case study.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In September 2009, the Executive Committee of UEFA (The Union of European 
Football Associations - European football’s governing body) approved a financial fair 
play concept which seeks to ensure the future well-being and health of professional 
football. Effective from season 2013/14, Financial Fair Play (FFP) regulations apply 
to all clubs which seek to participate in UEFA’s Europe-wide, transnational club 
competitions subject to a de minimis financial threshold. Designed to encourage 
clubs to adopt a more economically rational and sustainable approach to their 
activities, UEFA’s aim is to improve clubs’ financial management and financial 
performance in cognisance of the systemic environment of European club football in 
which clubs compete on and off the pitch. 
To some lay observers the need for FFP regulations will be surprising. The 
commercial development of European club football over the last two decades or 
so has been wide-ranging and its revenue performance continues to be extremely 
impressive. The most recent UEFA Benchmarking Report, compiled as part of that 
body’s club licensing scheme, reported a 3% increase in club incomes in 2011, 
reaching a record aggregate level of €13.2bn (see Figure 1.1). Over the five year 
period from 2007, club revenue grew at an aggregate rate of 5.6% pa, equivalent to 
24% over the entire period; this at a time when the average growth rate in Europe’s 
economies was 0.5% (UEFA, 2013).
 
Figure 1.1 Top division revenues (¤m)
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The consultants Deloitte (2013) estimate the revenue of the European football 
market at €19.4bn for 2011/12, with close to half of this revenue, €9.3bn, being 
generated by the ‘big five’ leagues in England, France, Germany, Italy and Spain 
(see Figure 1.2). 
Figure 1.2 Revenue breakdown for European leagues 2011/12 (¤m)
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The primary driver of this growth has been broadcasting income. Here the English 
Premier League (EPL) has led the way: its current three-year domestic rights deal 
with BSkyB and BT which began in season 2013/14 is worth £3.018bn (€3.815bn), 
a 71% increase on the previous deal. Continued growth in broadcasting income is 
apparent in other countries too, most notably Germany where its domestic rights 
deal, also effective from 2013/14, is worth €2.5bn over four seasons; the annual 
rights of €628m representing a 52% increase on the previous deal of €412m 
(EPFL, 2012). 
While one narrative which accompanies these figures is of a vibrant and successful 
industry, at the same time, conventional approaches to measuring the financial 
performance of clubs, in contrast to their revenue generation, present a less 
positive picture of escalating salary costs, unsustainable levels of debt, and clubs 
being placed in corporate rescue situations (Barajas and Rodríguez, 2010; Beech 
et al., 2010; IJSF, 2010; JSE, 2006; Solberg and Haugen, 2010). Managing the cost 
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base, and in particular player salaries, has long been football’s primary challenge. 
While the UEFA benchmark report notes that the percentage of club revenues paid 
out in salaries and social charges has stabilised at 65%, it also notes that 88 clubs 
(out of a total of 679) had a ratio greater than 100% (UEFA, 2013). Moreover, five 
clubs which participated in the 2011/12 group stages of UEFA’s Europe-wide club 
competitions, the Champions’ League or Europa League, had a ratio greater than 
100% (UEFA, 2012a). The share of total employee costs attributable to players 
was 81%, equivalent to €6.9bn in 2010/11 (UEFA, 2013). The consequences of this 
are evident in the overall financial performance of European football clubs: 63% of 
Europe’s top division clubs reported operating losses; 38% of clubs were in negative 
equity positions; and auditors expressed concern as to the validity of the going 
concern assumption at 1 in 7 clubs (UEFA, 2013). This situation is exacerbated by 
the economic crisis throughout Europe, which has limited the funding opportunities 
open to clubs and emphasised the risk to clubs’ sustainability unless there is a 
change in their behaviour.
It is this seemingly paradoxical situation - increasing revenues but declining financial 
performance and position – that has now directly influenced football policy in the 
introduction, by UEFA, of Financial Fair Play (FFP) regulations as part of its club 
licensing system. The starting point for UEFA’s FFP regulations are European 
clubs’ financial statements, the generally accepted means by which organisations 
communicate their financial performance and position in accordance with national 
and international financial reporting rules and guidance. Football club financial 
statements are in substance no different from those produced for organisations 
in other areas of business activity. As a result their focus is on providing useful 
information to rational economic decision-makers, that information concentrating 
on economic events and transactions and on their predicted financial impacts. 
However, the nature of football clubs and the behaviour of many stakeholders 
involved with those clubs, more often than not including their shareholders, calls 
into question the usefulness and role of traditional financial statements (Morrow, 
2013). Moreover, while financial statements are the starting point for FFP, clubs are 
required to prepare or rearrange that information with a particular purpose in mind, 
that purpose being guided by the social and organisational context of professional 
football. For example, the key performance indicator in FFP is a ‘break-even 
requirement’, which involves comparing ‘relevant costs’ and ‘relevant income’ over 
a three year period, relevance being dependent on political and value judgements 
about what type of activities clubs engage in and about how these are funded. 
Hence, the approach to regulation adopted by UEFA while seeking to address 
weaknesses in clubs’ financial behaviour and performance, also indirectly focuses 
attention on the nature and role of clubs’ financial statements. 
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Drawing on interviews with accountants and others with experience of working in 
and around the business side of football clubs in the UK, the aim of this research is 
to assess the potential impact of UEFA’s FFP regulations, focusing in particular on 
the relationship between FFP and football club financial reporting. The remainder 
of this report is structured as follows. Chapter two focuses on financial regulation 
in football, and provides a detailed insight into specific requirements of FFP. The 
research approach is set out in Chapter three, with the following three chapters 
devoted to research findings and discussion. Chapter four concentrates on attitudes 
towards conventional football club financial reporting; Chapter five provides a 
critical review of FFP; and Chapter six focuses on the implications of FFP for 
financial reporting. The conclusions and policy recommendations from the study are 
set out in Chapter seven.
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2.  FINANCIAL REGULATION IN PROFESSIONAL 
FOOTBALL
Despite the overall pattern of income growth in European club football set out 
in chapter one, it was the financial difficulties of so many of the clubs which 
participate in its Europe wide club competitions that lay behind UEFA’s decision to 
introduce FFP regulations as part of its club licensing system.
Club licensing
Club licensing, applicable to all clubs participating in UEFA’s Champions’ League 
and Europa League competitions, was introduced from season 2004/05 (Olsson, 
2011). It draws heavily on the German domestic club licensing system introduced in 
2000 (Wilkesmann et al., 2011), in which minimum criteria that clubs must achieve 
are specified in five separate categories - sporting, infrastructure, personnel and 
administrative, legal and financial (Müller, 2004; Olsson, 2011). The aim of the 
German system is to ensure that league members are capable of satisfying their 
sporting and financial commitments during the season, thus protecting the integrity 
of sporting competition and the commercial value of the Bundesliga (Wilkesmann et 
al., 2011). 
Club licensing in Germany is an interactive process. Clubs are required to submit 
to the Deutsche Fussball Liga (DFL) various items of documentation, including 
audited accounts and forecast profit and loss accounts, as well as legally binding 
documents providing assurance on things like whether the club’s liabilities are up 
to date and permitting  access to information held by the German Inland Revenue 
(Wilkesmann et al., 2011). The DFL has the opportunity to request clarification on 
information provided, and to seek further documentation as required to satisfy itself 
of the applicant’s economic strength, particularly around projected cash flow or 
liquidity. Essentially the league’s licensing officers have the right to adjust the club’s 
forecasts if they consider them to be imprudent (Green, 2011). Where concerns 
are expressed about a club’s liquidity forecasts, conditions will be imposed upon 
the club which must be fulfilled prior to a license being granted (Wilkesmann et 
al., 2011). Others, however, argue that the licensing body (the DFL) must base its 
licensing decisions only on the data provided by the clubs and that it is not entitled 
to question this data (Dietl and Frank, 2007). While to date no Bundesliga club has 
gone into administration (or equivalent) mid-season (Green, 2011), Dietl and Frank 
(2007) argue that this is simply because the DFL will not take radical action against 
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any of its major clubs. Press coverage of German football finance also alludes to 
clubs being saved via local state aid, asset sales, player securitisations and even 
inter-club loans (Samuel, 2012). 
One factor which may influence the extent to which sanctions are imposed 
under a licensing system is the independence of the licensing body or committee 
(Gouget & Primault, 2006). Another country with a long history of club licensing 
is the Netherlands. Its system was strengthened in 2003 with the inception of an 
independent licensing committee, set up to scrutinise the financial position and 
performance of clubs and with the authority to revoke club licences and to impose 
sanctions on clubs (Pieters and De Schryver, 2011). The independence of the 
licensing committee in the Netherlands is in marked contrast to the situation in 
Germany, where the licensing procedure is operated by the clubs’ own association, 
the DFL, and where hence the DFL has only the power granted to it by its 
member clubs. Indeed the licensing statutes in Germany include provisions that 
exempt the entire licensing procedure from any form of external control (Dietl and 
Franck, 2007). Similar conflicts of interest exist in other countries: for example, 
the (English) Football League’s Financial Fair Play panel, which will consider any 
challenges by clubs to its determination of the fair play result, is to be led by the 
Chairman of the Football League (Football League, 2012). The approach adopted 
by UEFA has been to set up a Club Financial Control Body (CFCB), tasked with 
overseeing the application and monitoring of the club licensing system and FFP 
regulations. The CFCB, has been established as a UEFA organ of justice, and 
has the power to impose disciplinary sanctions on clubs which do not meet the 
licensing or fair play requirements and decide on cases relating to eligibility for 
UEFA club competitions. CFCB members are independent (UEFA, 2012c).
Financial Fair Play
The focus of the FFP regulations is on improving clubs’ financial management and 
financial performance. Effective from 2013/14 but based on clubs’ financial results 
from season 2011/12 onwards, all clubs which meet a certain minimum threshold in 
terms of income and expenditure are required to satisfy various criteria in order to 
be licensed to participate in UEFA’s Europe-wide club competitions (UEFA, 2012b, 
Article 57, 2(b)). The aims of the regulations are reproduced in Figure 2.1. 
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Figure 2.1 Aims of FFP regulations
To protect the integrity and smooth running of UEFA club competitions. (Article 
2, Paragraph 1(d))
To achieve financial fair play in UEFA club competitions, and in particular:
(a) to improve the economic and financial capability of clubs, increasing their 
transparency and credibility;
(b) to place the necessary importance on the protection of creditors and to 
ensure that clubs settle their liabilities with players, social/taxation authorities 
and other clubs punctually;
(c) to introduce more discipline and rationality in club football finances;
(d) to encourage clubs to operate on the basis of their own revenues;
(e) to encourage responsible spending for the long-term benefit of football;
(f) to protect the long-term viability and sustainability of European club football.
(Article 2, Paragraph 2)
Source: UEFA, 2012b
Financial Fair Play – the basics
FFP is about encouraging clubs to improve the management of their cost base, 
achieving a sustainable balance between income, spending and investments. The 
key requirement is that clubs should report a break-even position, calculated by 
comparing relevant income and costs, over a rolling three year (initially two year) 
period. Break-even is not an absolute position, but rather one which is subject to 
‘an acceptable level of deviation’. Specifically, in any monitoring period a club can 
report an aggregate loss of €5m, while a further loss of initially €45m, but declining 
to €30m, is permitted as long as that excess is fully covered by equity injections 
from the club’s owners and/or related parties (Annex X, D). Table 2.1 sets out the 
break-even determination.
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Table 2.1 The break-even determination
Monitoring 
period
No. of 
years
Years included
Acceptable deviation 
(€m)
t - 2 t - 1 t Covered 
Not 
covered
2013/14 2 NA 2011/12 2012/13 45 5
2014/15 3 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 45 5
2015/16 3 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 30 5
2016/17 3 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16 30 5
2017/18 3 2014/15 2015/16 2016/17 30 5
2018/19 3 2015/16 2016/17 2017/18 <30 5
In determining break-even, clubs need only include what are defined as ‘relevant’ 
income and costs: at its simplest, clubs must match football expenditure with 
football income (see Figure 2.2). 
Figure 2.2 Notion of relevant income and expenses 
1  Relevant income is defined as revenue from gate receipts, broadcasting 
rights, sponsorship and advertising, commercial activities and other operating 
income, plus either profit on disposal of player registrations or income from 
disposal of player registrations, excess proceeds on disposal of tangible fixed 
assets and finance income. It does not include any non-monetary items or 
certain income from non-football operations.
2  Relevant expenses is defined as cost of sales, employee benefits expenses 
and other operating expenses, plus either amortisation or costs of acquiring 
player registrations, finance costs and dividends. It does not include 
development activities, expenditure on community development activities, 
any other non-monetary items, finance costs directly attributable to the 
construction of tangible fixed assets, tax expenses or certain expenses from 
non-football operations.
3  Relevant income and expenses must be calculated and reconciled by the 
licensee to the annual financial statements and/or underlying accounting 
records, i.e. historic, current or future financial information as appropriate.
4  Relevant income and expenses from related parties must be adjusted to 
reflect the fair value of any such transactions.
Source: UEFA, 2012b, Article 58
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Whilst expenditure incurred on player salaries and amortisation of player 
acquisitions are considered as relevant costs, by contrast depreciation of tangible 
fixed assets, expenditure on youth development or community activities and finance 
costs incurred in the construction of tangible fixed assets may be excluded from the 
determination. Similar rules apply to the determination of income: in broad terms 
this is income derived from football activities. Income is not treated as relevant only 
where it is clearly and exclusively not related to the activities, location or brand of 
the football club. Hence a facility like a hotel proximate to a club’s stadium could be 
classified as relevant income (Annex X, Para B.k).
Paragraph 4 of Article 58 introduces the concepts of related parties and fair 
value, concepts which are well established in accounting standards and taxation 
legislation. In terms of FFP a person or close member of a person’s family is related 
to a reporting entity (club) if that person has control, joint control or influence over 
the club, or is a key member of the management team of the club or the club’s 
parent entity, whether directly or through another entity. An entity is related to the 
reporting entity if the two entities are part of the same group or if they are in some 
defined way involved in a joint venture together (Annex 10, E). Fair value is the sum 
at which an asset could be exchanged or a liability settled on arms’ length basis 
assuming knowledgeable and willing parties (Annex 10, E, 7). Fair value is thus 
distinct from market value: it is the sum at which one might reasonably expect an 
asset to be exchanged or a liability settled on the basis of prior evidence.
Examples provided, which require to be included at fair value include: the sale of 
sponsorship rights by a club to a related party; the sale of corporate hospitality 
tickets, and/or use of an executive box, by a club to a related party; and any 
transaction with a related party whereby goods or services are provided to a club. 
Under the provisions of Annex X, D, the difference between the income received 
from a related party and the fair value recognised in the break-even calculation can 
be treated as an equity contribution from a related party in terms of covering the 
acceptable deviation set out in Table 2.1.
Two other requirements add to the elasticity of the break-even concept. First, there 
is an opportunity to use break-even surpluses from the two years immediately 
preceding the monitoring period to compensate for any break-even deficit during 
the monitoring period (Article 63, para. 2b), and second, where the break-even 
requirement is not fulfilled, the CFCB can consider a number of mitigating factors 
as set out in Annex XI of the regulations. These include the quantum and trend 
of the break-even result, the projected break-even result for the year t+1, and the 
licensing applicant’s budgeting accuracy.
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While the break-even requirement has dominated coverage of FFP, other 
requirements in club licensing have also been reinforced, in particular those 
concerned with clubs having overdue payables to their employees, the taxation 
authorities or other clubs. Previously clubs had only to prove that they had no such 
overdue payables as at 31st March preceding the licensing season; the licensing 
decision being based on activities up until the cut off period of 31st December in 
the previous year. Consequently there was an opportunity for clubs to engage in 
cash flow management over a fifteen month period to the possible detriment of 
their employees, other clubs and/or the tax authorities, but without any risk of 
sanction in terms of the licence award. Under the new system, this information 
is also required at the 30th of June in the year that the UEFA club competitions 
commence. Should a club have overdue payables then it is deemed to be in breach 
of Indicator 4 (Article 62), meaning that it is required to demonstrate that it has no 
overdue payables as at 30th September (Articles 65, 66), in practice moving closer 
to quarterly monitoring. 
Moreover, if a club’s financial statements include an emphasis of matter or a 
qualified audit opinion in respect of the club as a going concern (Indicator 1, 
Article 62) or if they demonstrate a net liabilities position that has deteriorated 
relative to the prior year comparative figure (Indicator 2, Article 62), then the club 
is required to provide future financial information including a budgeted profit and 
loss account, budgeted cash flow statement and explanatory notes (Articles 52). In 
addition, where a club’s financial statements show that its wages and social costs 
are greater than 70% of its turnover, or where its net debt exceeds 100% of its 
turnover, the CFCB may ask a club to submit additional financial information (Article 
62).
The case for and against regulation
The desirability of regulatory intervention in European football and of FFP in 
particular, has been questioned by some sport economists. Vöpel (2011), for 
example, suggests that such regulation may in fact be dynamically inefficient, 
inadvertently serving to protect well established clubs from being challenged by 
other clubs, as a consequence of imposing a ceiling on deficits and restricting 
equity contributions by owners and others. In a study focusing on insolvency in 
English football, Szymanski (2012) noted that notwithstanding the number of 
football clubs which go into administration, few actually disappear. Moreover, he 
argued that the cause of administration was not ‘irrational exuberance’ where 
owners live beyond their means in order to achieve a better league position, but 
instead was caused by external negative shocks to either productivity (e.g. bad 
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luck on the field) or demand (e.g. a substantial diminution in a media rights deal). 
Szymanski concluded that intervention initiatives such as FFP are misguided as 
they do not address the actual cause of insolvency, focusing instead on perceived 
management failures. However, others argue that regulatory interventions can 
be regarded as theoretically justifiable. The inter-dependent nature of sporting 
competition creates a risk that one club’s behaviour may result in negative 
externalities for other clubs (as well as other stakeholders) with repercussions for 
the integrity of the competition (see, for example, Müller et al., 2012; Storm, 2012; 
Storm and Nielsen, 2012). 
Returning to Szymanski (2012), he argued that the paucity of clubs in administration 
which then become insolvent is a consequence of three factors: 
•	 the	enduring	support	of	at	least	some	of	a	club’s	supporters,	this	ensuring	a	club	
in administration continues to generate revenue; 
•	 that	a	club	can	always	adjust	its	wage	structure	to	match	its	current	status;	and
•	 that	because	commonly	community	interest-type	restrictions	are	placed	upon	the	
disposal of land on which a club’s main asset, its stadium, sits, the only viable use 
of an insolvent football’s company assets is continuation as a football club. 
The first and third of these factors suggest that professional football is not a field 
guided only by financial logics, but rather one in which multiple stakeholders 
interact, steered also by broader social considerations and logics (Gammelsæter 
and Senaux, 2011; Morrow, 2014; Nash, 2000). Moreover, given football’s social and 
institutional context, to many it is unacceptable to rely on the market to discipline 
behaviour, as rather than punishing failed owners, the losers will tend to be 
supporters and the communities within which clubs reside, as well as stakeholders 
like employees, creditors and tax payers who unwillingly contribute funds to loss-
making football clubs (Morrow, 2012; Müller et al., 2013; Storm, 2012; Storm and 
Nielsen, 2012). In addition, even in those clubs which have been most spectacularly 
mismanaged, resulting in the most negative economic and social consequences, 
society in the shape of a football club’s communities often deem the organisation 
(as distinct from its owners and managers) as worthy of support at all costs. 
Storm (2012) and Storm and Nielsen (2012) argue that this can be explained by 
the fact that professional football clubs operate within soft budget constraints, 
drawing parallels with the way in which state enterprises in socialist economies 
are always able to renegotiate additional subsidies. If one accepts that football clubs 
are economic in basis but social in nature, then a specific type of public interest 
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argument can be invoked to support FFP (Feintuck, 2010), protecting the interests 
of an individual club’s public(s) - its supporters wherever located, communities, 
businesses and commercial partners - and the wider community of football 
encompassing other clubs, leagues and other competitions. 
Having outlined the case for and against regulation and the specific requirements 
set out in UEFA’s FFP regulations, the next chapter will explain the research 
approach adopted in this project to assess the potential impact of the regulations 
and their implications for financial reporting.
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3.  APPROACH TO THE PROJECT
This chapter gives details of the aim and objectives of the project and of the 
research approach and methodology adopted.
Aim and objectives of the project
The aim of the project was to assess the potential impact of UEFA’s FFP 
Regulations, focusing in particular on the relationship between FFP and 
conventional financial reporting and on implications for football club financial 
reporting. More specifically, the project objectives were as follows:
•	 To	consider	the	observations	and	insights	of	professional	accountants	and	others	
with experience of working in and around the business side of football clubs in 
the UK on:
o the requirements set out in UEFA’s FFP regulations;
o the usefulness of conventional financial reporting for professional football 
clubs; and
o the implications for football club financial reporting of the requirements 
set out in UEFA’s FFP regulations and whether there are alternative forms 
of reporting about, and accounting for, the performance and position of 
football clubs which better communicate the value and significance of these 
institutions.
The study was focused on those clubs in the top divisions in England (the EPL) 
and Scotland (then the SPL) which were most likely to be affected by the FFP 
regulations. That is, those clubs which had a recent history of participation and/or a 
likelihood of qualifying on sporting grounds to participate in UEFA club competitions 
in the immediate future, and which met the UEFA FFP threshold (i.e. relevant 
income and relevant expenses of at least €5m) (UEFA, 2012b, Article 57, para. 2). 
This review of performance took place in the summer of 2012.
Research approach
While it was not anticipated that all interviewees would have direct involvement with 
FFP itself, it was expected that their knowledge of financial reporting and football 
would leave them well positioned to contribute to the debate. It is acknowledged 
that many interviewees were not independent of financial management and 
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financial reporting in particular football clubs. However, as the purpose of the 
research was to understand professional accountants’ and advisers’ views on FFP, 
in this case the lack of independence was both inevitable and desirable. Interviewee 
selection was a function of their anticipated knowledge of and engagement with 
football club financial reporting and FFP. 
Interview request letters were sent in December 2012 to twelve clubs in England 
and Scotland. The letters made it clear that while interviewees were being 
contacted due to their association with a particular club, the project was concerned 
with generic issues around FFP and financial reporting and hence no conflict 
of interest was considered to arise. Moreover, it was made clear that no club or 
audit firm would be identified in any published work. Ultimately five clubs and five 
auditors agreed to be interviewed. Two clubs declined to participate. Two auditors 
also declined to take part, on the grounds of client confidentiality. Another auditor 
agreed to participate if this was approved by the club which engaged him as 
auditor, but unfortunately it was not possible to elicit any response from that club. 
The remainder of clubs and audit firms failed to respond. Interviews were also 
requested with a number of individuals from accounting and consulting firms with 
a recognised expertise in some aspect of advising or reporting on professional 
football clubs, resulting in a further three interviews. 
The interviews with club officials, auditors and industry experts (n=13) took place 
between January and September 2013. All interviews were taped and transcribed 
except one where the interviewee indicated that it was preferred that notes be 
taken. The interviews lasted between 30 and 51 minutes (M= 41, SD = 7.7).
While the majority of these interviews were conducted on a face-to-face basis 
(n= 11), it was necessary to conduct two interviews by telephone. Manual content 
analysis was used to ensure that the researcher was not distanced from the data 
(Davis & Meyer, 2009). The first stage of the analysis involved each interview being 
reviewed by the researcher and the extraction of raw-data quotes relevant to the 
project aims: specifically conventional football club financial reporting, FFP and 
implications for football club reporting. These quotes were then ordered around a 
number of sub-themes. There is much that can be revealed in the direct quotes of 
the participants and in cognisance of the research objectives, emphasis has been 
placed on direct interviewee quotes in the results section (Woodman & Hardy, 
2001). 
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Three further interviews were held. The rationale for FFP was explored at 
transnational level, with UEFA’s Benchmarking Manager, responsible for the 
monitoring of clubs’ financial reporting and the preparation of the annual European 
Club Licensing Benchmarking Report (UEFA, 2013). Interviews were also held with 
representatives of one of the home-based national associations and with one of 
the home-based leagues which has taken a lead in implementing domestic FFP 
regulations. In total, therefore, 16 interviews took place.
While the project focused only on British clubs and hence on financial reporting in 
the limited liability corporate model prevalent among British football clubs, it has 
wider relevance given that FFP is operative throughout all of UEFA’s 53 national 
member associations. Moreover, the nature of football and its clubs mean that 
there is a public interest in financial fair play, in UEFA’s FFP regulations and in 
related issues like the structure of clubs and accountability, including financial 
accountability, which stakeholders expect of club owners and officials.
Results and analysis
The following three chapters are concerned with the three key themes arising from 
the interviews: the role and usefulness of existing football club financial statements; 
perspectives on FFP; and implications for football club reporting in the future. In 
these chapters interviewees are identified only by their category; for example, club 
1, auditor 2, adviser 1 or GBL 1 (football governing body/league). The only exception 
to this is UEFA’s Benchmarking Manager who is identified by his position.
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4.  FOOTBALL CLUB FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
Financial reporting is that part of accounting which focuses on communicating with 
users external to the organisation and is considered to have two basic objectives: 
•	 accountability,	i.e.	that	the	accounts	should	provide	information	about	how	
effectively and efficiently management has discharged their responsibilities to 
use and manage the entity’s existing resources, sometimes referred to as the 
control or stewardship objective; and 
•	 decision-making,	i.e.	that	accounts	should	provide	a	basis	for	decision-making	
(Mellemvik et al., 1988).
Financial reporting involves the preparation of general purpose financial statements; 
these provide information about the position, performance, and cash flows of 
an entity, supplemented by accompanying narrative information. The primary 
users are present and potential investors, lenders and other creditors, who use 
that information to make decisions about buying, selling or holding equity or debt 
instruments and providing or settling loans or other forms of credit (IFRS, 2013). 
What has been constructed by standard setting bodies is hence a very specific and 
limited image of the financial statement user, a rational economic decision-maker. 
The majority of interviewees articulated a conventional description of the purpose 
of a football club’s financial statements, for example: ‘a snapshot of the company’s 
finances ...and a report of the profitability of the year just gone’ (club 2); ‘displaying 
a true and fair view’ (auditor 2); and ‘provide information for the users of those 
accounts’ (auditor 4). Two auditors also drew attention to the fact that football 
club financial statements are no more or less useful than financial statements 
for companies operating in other sectors, drawing attention to wider debates 
about what role financial reporting should play and the need for forward-looking 
information (auditors 3 and 5). 
What also emerged from the interviews, however, was a strong, but rather limited, 
emphasis on compliance:
We prepare financial statements because we are required to do 
so. There are obligations placed upon us by the Companies Acts, 
[other] authorities that we must comply with. (club 3)
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…[from a] limited company point of view, we’re just doing the 
accounts because we have to do them …it’s a box we have to tick. 
(club 4)
So I would say that it is the ambition of the clubs to comply with 
the [accounting] rules [and disclosure requirements] but not one 
millimetre more than that and you can’t blame them for that. 
(auditor 3)  
Several interviewees stressed the assurance function of financial statements, 
and the importance of disclosure, emphasising their importance to traditional 
financial statement users; primarily shareholders, but also suppliers, lenders and 
customers, as well as in this case regulatory authorities. 
…from a financial perspective if you’re looking at it ...who funds 
the club …be it a bank or principal shareholder, then it provides 
them with an element of assurance on the results. (auditor 1)
…the key thing we get out a football club’s set of accounts [are] 
the debt figures. …not only how much debt …but how it’s all 
structured ...Wage costs is something that we obviously look at …
because ...everything in the P&L account of a football club seems 
to be driven by that wage cost. (GBL 2)
In the context of assurance, however, it was also recognised that financial 
statements may not provide the full picture for some clubs:
…[accounts] do not provide full visibility. …They might show that 
on the face of it, [the club] has a real going concern issue …and 
that might be an issue for suppliers. But …often the financial 
support available to that entity [from its owners] goes above and 
beyond what’s in the accounts. (auditor 4)
UEFA’s Benchmarking Report for 2011 reported that 106 of the 663 reviewed year-
end club audit reports contained an adverse, emphasis of matter or qualified audit 
opinion regarding going concern (UEFA, 2013). Certainly some of these clubs will 
have had a concentrated ownership structure, that is to say a benefactor owner 
willing to provide support beyond that evident in the financial statements. Looking 
ahead, however, the introduction of the new and expanded audit report in the UK 
(FRC, 2013) and similar developments elsewhere should provide improved visibility 
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and understanding for a company’s stakeholders, providing far more insight than 
the binary pass/fail model of the previous audit report.  
Football competitions are peculiar economic activities which rely on individual 
organisations co-operating under the auspices of another economic unit, a league 
or governing body, to provide a marketable product (Neale, 1964; Sloane, 1971). 
Inevitably in such a structure, the failure of one club has implications, sporting 
and financial, for other competitors therein and may even call into question the 
credibility and integrity of that competition (Morrow, 2014; Neale, 1964; Vöpel, 2011). 
Given this, it is unsurprising that the financial statements’ role in providing comfort 
to football governing bodies and leagues in terms of the credibility and sustainability 
of their competitions was highlighted by a number of interviewees:
…the regulatory authorities …they’re interested in [financial 
statements] from a sustainability perspective …[they would be] 
mortified at the prospect of a club going out of business during a 
competition. (club 2)
…it’s important for the credibility of clubs like us and [for] the 
league to show that ...clubs are properly run. (club 1)
…[with limited resources] you have got to hang your hat on the 
auditors’ professional ability to give you the right information. 
...the [best] thing to do is just to look at the accounts. (GBL 1)
In contrast to assurance and comfort, limited emphasis was placed on the role that 
financial statements play in terms of decision-making (Mellemvik et al., 1988). For 
example:
…if I was going to buy a football club, I’m not sure I’d start with 
[the financial statements]...(auditor 1)
This was attributed to a number of factors, including:
•	 The	limited	relevance	the	notion	of	a	rational	economic	decision-maker	has	for	
many football club users (Morrow, 2013).
•	 The		concentrated	ownership	structure	at	interviewees’	clubs	or	clubs	that	
they were familiar with and the lack of share trading (Carlin and Mayer, 2000; 
Morrow, 2013).
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•	 The	peculiar	objectives	of	European	football	clubs,	often	encompassing	utility	
and/or revenue maximisation rather than profit maximisation (Arnold and 
Beneviste, 1987; Cairns et al., 1986; Késenne, 2006; Millward, 2013).
•	 That	the	motivations	of	many	football	investors	are	ostensibly	non-pecuniary	(de	
Ruyter and Wetzels, 2000; Morrow, 1999, 2000; Webb and Broadbent, 1986): 
…sensible investors do not invest in football clubs to make money. 
It’s not something that one does rationally, it is about the emotion 
and about being part of something that is successful on the football 
pitch. (auditor 3)
…[the accounts] are not as important to a club as to a profit 
oriented business in the normal sense, because often the backers 
of football clubs have motives and finances beyond what appears 
in the accounts and are happy to back things above and beyond 
what might look reasonable based solely on the accounts and 
normal financial expectations. (auditor 4)
•	 The	dichotomy	between	historical	statements	and	an	industry	with	a	particularly	
conspicuous short-term operating context: 
…they’re already six months out of date. [They give you an 
indication] but you’ve got to understand the industry, because so 
much of it is driven by success on the field ...things change too 
quickly. (club 1)
•	 Their	lack	of	emphasis	on	the	true	or	underlying	nature	of	the	business:	
…what’s more important for a football club is the cash position, 
not so much the accounting position ...So what you’ll see in terms 
of profit and loss account [e.g. around players and transfer fees] is 
a bit false. (adviser 1)
…due diligence …exists because you get very little from statutory 
financial statements. I mean, somebody who’s going to buy an 
entity, a football club or otherwise, needs to get underneath the 
operations, the trends, the prospects, a whole host of things which 
by any stretch of the imagination you’re not going to get from 
statutory information. (adviser 2)
There was no agreement on the role played by financial statements in terms of 
wider disclosure and accountability to stakeholders, in particular to clubs’ supporter 
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communities. Some interviewees highlighted ‘best practice’ clubs and the quality of 
information disclosed:
Our financial report is a decent read. ...But few read it I suspect. 
They may read the Chairman’s Statement, the Profit and Loss 
maybe; the remuneration details certainly. But there is [also] 
plenty there if you want to understand what the club is doing, 
including our social and community engagement. (club 3)
…there is quite a lot of interest in them ...particularly from the fans 
[who] want to understand as much as they can about the football 
club. And this is a source of information they can get hold of...
(auditor 3)
Some interviewees, however, questioned whether the type of information and the 
way in which it is presented - whether by design or default – satisfied the needs of 
clubs’ specialist user groups. 
…most of the questions that are being asked by the stakeholders 
and most of what UEFA’s trying to achieve in terms of FFP – very 
little is addressed by the financial statements ... [Those are] a legal 
requirement, different by country and it’s not really addressing 
any of the questions I believe that your typical shareholder would 
have or that UEFA is trying to get greater transparency on. 
They’re just two parallel things which are not joined up in any 
way. (adviser 2)
I think clubs ...could do a lot more to explain their financial position 
to their fans. ...I think sometimes they just shy away from it 
because they don’t want to admit ...actually ...we can’t afford [to do 
certain things]. Actually I think they’re better to go the other way; 
explaining, ‘well here’s exactly what we’re doing and why we 
need to do it’ and give some kind of analogy to [supporters’] own 
lives about budgeting. (adviser 1)
You’ve got to be an accounting genius to try and understand 
what’s behind the accounts. ...you see assets and liabilities, [but] 
you only see an overview ...not the whole picture necessarily. You 
may not see whether next year’s season tickets have already been 
sold and discounted to a financier, things like that. (adviser 3)
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Tax authorities seem quite interested but again it’s not really 
what’s in the accounts that interests them, it’s transactions 
involving players and agents. (auditor 5)
The emphasis on financial reporting as facilitating rational economic action limits 
the opportunity to explore the social and organisational context in which particular 
organisations exist and its implications for stakeholder accountability, something 
which may have particular relevance for football clubs (Morrow, 2013). One of the 
paradoxes of the increased revenue generation of football, coupled with on-going 
weaknesses in clubs’ financial management has been an increased demand from 
clubs’ supporters for information, control and accountability. While decision-makers 
in clubs and the popular press understand this desire and are in a position to profit 
from supporters’ attachments to their clubs, the nature of the field within which 
clubs play means that genuine accountability is not easily achieved by supporters 
(Cooper and Johnston, 2012). 
At one level financial statements are likely to be a useful source of information to 
some supporters in terms of accountability. However, their potential usefulness is 
limited by traditional criticisms, most notably their lack of timeliness which results in 
historical accountability, and the focus on the connection between accounting and 
the shareholder/lender as the economic decision-maker. This focus inevitably limits 
the scope of accountability to an economic account (Shearer, 2002; Young, 2006). 
Thus the financial statements present a narrative of financial performance - often a 
narrative of failing business in strict financial terms. Other types of information that 
might be construed as meaningful or useful under an alternative construction of the 
financial statement user and which may lie at the heart of supporters’ relationship 
with their club are often ignored or peripheral to the disclosure. One example is 
clubs’ social and community engagement, something which is also likely to be of 
interest to community groups and to facets of government. 
However, an opposing view was offered by two interviewees who questioned 
whether demand from specialist users actually exists in the first place:  
I don’t think there is a fundamental interest in finance …I think the 
inevitability of the commercialisation of football is that perhaps 
fans feel more detached than they’d like to be from their clubs. 
(club 1)
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I don’t think [supporters] have the slightest interest in the 
accounts. I think they are interested in what 11 players do on the 
pitch …in most of these businesses, the clue is probably in the 
name ‘club’. (auditor 5)
Perhaps more pertinently, those involved on the regulatory side of football, 
concentrated on a disconnect between substance and form in terms of disclosure. 
In particular, attention was drawn to the lack of quantity and quality of disclosure on 
player wages, despite its overriding importance to financial performance:
I think sometimes they’re intentionally written in a way that is 
just really, really difficult to [comprehend]. [We received one set 
of statements last week] …and there was one crucial figure in it 
which was to do with the level of [salary] expenditure and it was 
the one and only area where there were no notes to go with it. 
(GBL 1)
The level of disclosure was also highlighted by UEFA in its most recent 
benchmarking report. It drew attention to the fact that in most countries, financial 
reporting requirements do not require clubs to break down their employee costs, 
something which would be of great use in an industry in which total employee 
costs equate to 65% of revenue, and which it is estimated that 81% of total 
employee costs are in respect of player salaries (UEFA, 2013, 94). 
Summary
Overall, the impression gained from interviewees is that the role of financial 
statements is limited to that of providing some assurance to some accounts users, 
both traditional users and football specific users. However, given the financial 
performance and position reported by so many clubs it is questionable what level 
of assurance is being provided to users assessing those clubs on a conventional 
financial basis. Indeed it is precisely those concerns about the lack of profitability 
and rising debt levels that have been the motivation for UEFA to put in place 
enhanced financial regulation of its clubs. Moreover, what is emphatically clear 
is that the limitations of conventional historical financial statements, coupled with 
peculiarities in the financial and ownership structure of many football clubs, result 
in annual reports being of little or no use as decision-making tools.
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5.  FINANCIAL FAIR PLAY
While the starting point for FFP is clubs’ financial statements, the principles and 
detailed rules specified by UEFA suggest that the information is only useful if it 
prepared or re-arranged, with a particular purpose in mind and with due attention 
to social and organisational context. From one perspective this approach is not 
markedly different to that found in other areas of regulated activity, such as utilities. 
The variety of countries represented through UEFA means that it is necessary to 
introduce common rules of accounting and presentation to ensure that all clubs 
are treated fairly. Another interpretation, however, is that this approach is evidence 
of problematisation. According to Rose and Miller (1992), problematisation exists 
where existing practice in some area of public policy choice is seen in some way 
as deficient, leading to the identification of a ‘problem’ for which an appropriate 
solution is required. Miller (1991) suggests that for problematisation to take place, 
particular accounting practices and problems need to be restated or reinterpreted 
in specific ways – in his terms translated – to provoke support for the view that the 
problem exists and that it will be corrected by the solution proposed. Miller (1991) 
suggests translation takes place where particular accounting practices become 
tied to broader, widely desirable goals such as enhanced accountability and more 
efficient resource allocation. 
Attitudes to FFP
It was universally accepted by interviewees that the evidence available on the 
financial performance and position of major European football clubs demonstrated 
the existence of a ‘problem’ (Miller, 1991; Rose and Miller, 1992). Interviewees 
talked in terms of: ‘a need to get some financial sanity into European football’ (club 
1); ‘saving clubs from themselves’ (auditor 3); ‘being correct to try and make [clubs] 
live within their means’ (club 4) and ‘trying to think about financial viability and 
stability going forward’ (auditor 2). Among the interviewees there was widespread 
support for the principles underlying the introduction of enhanced (football) 
financial regulation and broad support for UEFA’s ‘solution’; the introduction of FFP. 
There was also broad support for the regulatory approach: its use of an objective 
starting point (clubs’ audited annual financial statements) for regulation; the 
emphasis on both principles and detailed rules in the FFP framework; and on the 
restatement and reinterpretation of relevant income and expenditure. 
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Focusing on the detail of the regulations, there was particularly strong support for 
the enhanced rules around the monitoring of overdue payables, not least because 
of the clear relationship with cash, but also due to the importance of preserving 
sporting integrity within football competitions and perceptions of clubs gaining an 
unfair competitive advantage. For example:
…the overdue creditors rule …I haven’t met one person who would 
say a word against that. (club 1)
Cash drives everything in football - it is essential in terms of the 
fairness of competition that clubs settle their obligations with the 
football fraternity. (club 3)
While the interviews were conducted too early to permit observation on the 
effectiveness of FFP in practice, several interviewees commented favourably that 
at least clubs were beginning to ‘talk the talk’ (club 3) in terms of greater financial 
discipline. It was also noted by one interviewee that the impact of FFP was 
important in a more conventional financial investment sense:
What is of interest, certainly to the investment community, is 
the impact of FFP ...[a lot of questions have been asked] about 
the potential impact of FFP ...mainly from a positive perspective 
of seeing it as the first real mechanism in trying to curb player 
wage inflation which is the sort of scourge of every investment 
community when it comes to looking at football clubs. (club 2)
UEFA has emphasised that its FFP regulations, which are guided by explicit socio-
economic intentions specified in the high level principles (UEFA, 2012b, Articles 
1 and 2) emerged from stakeholder dialogue within the ‘football family’ including: 
the ECA (European Club Association), the body representing football clubs at 
European level; the EPFL (European Professional Football Leagues); and FIFPro, 
the worldwide professional organisation for all professional football players (UEFA, 
2009). Geey (2011) claims that this process of consultation resulted in a number 
of concessions being made including the provisions set out in Annex XI (mitigating 
factors which can be considered by UEFA in respect of the FFP monitoring 
requirements), and the removal of all infrastructure and youth development costs 
from the break-even calculation. Stakeholder engagement is offered by UEFA as a 
key defence that it will put forward should any challenge to its regulations emerge 
in due course from dissatisfied clubs. Key to this, however, is the commitment of 
all stakeholders involved in FFP to the attainment of those principles in practice, 
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something which will only become evident as the regulations take effect, and if and 
when sanctions are applied.
Interestingly, attitudes among club interviewees to the precise nature of that 
engagement varied markedly (to ensure anonymity, the following quotes have been 
left unattributed):
It is difficult to be critical of the process as everyone – National 
Associations, the ECA, etc. - had an opportunity to comment and 
all these bodies employed their advisors to go through it.
I think there was an element of engagement. Certainly x was 
involved through the ECA in ...looking at the rules very seriously 
when they were being drawn up and certainly we had a chance to 
input before they were signed up by UEFA’s executive committee. 
...So ...I don’t think we can complain about how much chance we 
got to give our input.
It’s great for UEFA to say, look the ECA bought into this and 
helped us develop the rules. [But] it wasn’t as if they came to the 
ECA and said ‘what do you think about Financial Fair Play and 
this break-even rule’?  They came with a scheme, this is what 
we’re going to do ...[all] the ECA [FFP working group] managed to 
do was ...put in sufficient [qualifications] – extend the timescales, 
give clubs more time to comply, perhaps water down the 
sanctions a little bit, certainly in the early years. So we managed 
to soften it round the edges. But that’s very different to saying that 
ECA were completely compliant in introducing that. That isn’t the 
case.
In part, however, these responses are reflective of different ownership and 
governance structures and business models prevalent in Europe’s largest football 
clubs (Gammelsæter and Senaux, 2011). Clubs with more established business 
models would be expected to be more relaxed about the introduction of FFP, as it 
presents little threat to the way in which they operate. At the same time these clubs 
may see FFP as dealing with the moral hazard that arises from clubs which can 
sustain huge losses gaining a competitive advantage (Storm and Nielsen, 2012). 
In contrast clubs seeking to challenge established clubs, whether supported by a 
benefactor owner or otherwise, may well interpret the rules as a barrier to entry and 
a mechanism to reinforce the status quo in terms of sporting success (Vöpel, 2011).
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The break-even requirement
A central aspect of FFP is the break-even result, where financial information is 
restated in terms of relevant income and relevant costs. The use of the three year 
rolling average was welcomed by a number of interviewees as a way of militating 
against the inevitable vagaries of seasonal playing performance and resultant 
financial consequences (club 5; auditor 5). FFP’s emphasis on using financial 
information to encourage clubs to take decisions which are in the long term interest 
of football and football clubs, and which reflect the specific social context in which 
these institutions operate (Laughlin and Puxty, 1983), was also broadly welcomed 
by club interviewees and by some other interviewees. One interviewee likened it to 
a system of offering tax relief to encourage certain activities (adviser 1).
…it’s good that money gets invested into the game, as long as it’s 
around development, [or] infrastructure. But not this short term, 
buy a player; pay a player – unless it’s self-financing. …. It’s not 
trying to stop money coming into the game from [owners]. If 
that’s going to the right sort of area ...that’s a good thing. (adviser 
2)
[Break-even is] clearly a sound objective; that you shouldn’t be 
penalised for investing in youth development or ...local community. 
…. Similarly, ...they wouldn’t want clubs to be deterred from 
investing in their infrastructure. So I think those allowable items 
are absolutely fine. (club 2)
One of the auditor interviewees, while in favour of the break-even approach, 
stressed the importance of ensuring that regulation does not drive negative 
behaviour or have unintended consequences such as leading to a reduction 
in investment in community projects (auditor 3). In his view there was a risk 
that some clubs may seek to reclassify certain cost items in order to meet the 
criteria, a point also raised by club 1. A more fundamental concern identified was 
inconsistency between FFP break-even and ‘actual’ financial viability; something 
which was considered surprising given that one of UEFA’s stated objectives is to 
protect the long-term viability and sustainability of European club football (UEFA, 
2012, Article 2, para. 2(f)). For example:
…as an independent auditor, what’s inconsistent [are] some of the 
exclusions - to say they want their cake and eat it almost. Look, 
we’ll take out youth development; we’ll take out expenditure on 
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the stadium and depreciation related to that, those sort of things. 
Surely that still impacts on the financial viability of an entity?  So 
why would those get excluded?  (auditor 2)
A further note of caution was introduced by one of the club interviewees who 
observed that a break-even type model does not in itself actually encourage clubs 
to make profit and/or to invest that profit; behaviour which would be considered 
rational in other industries experiencing such rapid revenue growth (club 2). 
Some disquiet also emerged about the inputs focus of the regulations, i.e. that all 
expenditure on ‘approved activities’ is assumed to be good expenditure, and the risk 
that, in extremis, this may lead to dysfunctional behaviour: 
[While] I kind of get the youth bit, I’m not so sure about the 
stadium bit. ...if they’d maybe been more targeted about it - 
expenditure to upgrade [or focusing on] safety ...or something 
like that. Whereas if it’s all about just, you know, gin palaces for 
stadiums ...then that’s maybe the wrong way to be thinking. 
(adviser 1)
…there’s a risk that people will run football clubs by the FFP rules 
to the extent that they’ll say that infrastructure spending is good, 
player spending bad and ...they’ll perhaps undertake projects that, 
from a financial standpoint would be nonsensical, but because 
they’re looking at it [in terms of] the FFP regulations it will be 
worthwhile. So they’ll be spending a huge amount of capital to get 
a very small P&L return just because that’s permissible, which as 
a CA is bizarre really. (club 1)
One interviewee linked this to the risks of the benefactor owner model, where a 
club’s stability and certainty of purpose are wholly reliant on that owner’s continued 
support (Lang, 2013; Morrow, 2012).
…an obvious [risk] is in terms of allowed income and allowed 
expenditure. You could break-even but if Mr X [who] owns a 
club decides to invest a mammoth amount in training facilities 
and infrastructure and then for whatever reason that individual 
...decide to stop putting money into the club [then] the club can 
very quickly run out of money. (adviser 2)
The emphasis placed in the regulations on profit as opposed to cash was 
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commented on frequently. One auditor argued that the lack of complexity in football 
club working capital meant that in practice sufficient emphasis was afforded to cash 
(auditor 5), while another observed that over the medium term, cash and profit 
should be related to each other (auditor 3). However, surprise was expressed by 
most interviewees that the break-even measure and hence measures of accounting 
profit had been prioritised over cash flow: 
I don’t think there is any emphasis on cash flow whatsoever. Some 
of us were lobbying for some cash control measure, rather than 
profit. [But] UEFA had its model very early on and were inflexible 
in terms of considering [it]. (club 1)
One thing we found slightly surprising ...was that [FFP] wasn’t 
more cash flow based ...Everybody knows a club goes out of 
business because it runs out of cash, not because it doesn’t 
make profits. [But] maybe the trade-off was using the profit and 
loss account just keeps it very simple and straightforward and 
hopefully there are enough warning signs if there’s going to be 
problems. (club 2)
Cash is king in football. Other than the focus on overdue payables, 
which are clearly a function of cash, the answer as to whether 
there is sufficient emphasis on cash is clearly a ‘No’. (club 3)
Moreover, the lack of direct emphasis on cash may be viewed as surprising given 
the numbers of European clubs (1 in 7) in respect of which auditors have expressed 
concern about the validity of the going concern assumption (UEFA, 2013).
FFP challenges
Notwithstanding the broad support for FFP, a number of challenges were identified. 
The principal concern centred on UEFA’s ability and/or willingness to enforce 
the regulations. This focused on a number of distinct though connected areas 
including: the politics and political economy of regulation (Hodgkinson, 2010; Moran, 
2010) and of football (Olsson, 2011); and possible consequences of regulatory 
enforcement. For example:
The big high profile clubs? I can’t believe they’ll be excluded unless 
they want to make examples [of them] and it would be really 
disappointing if they did. And again, that impacts on the efficacy of 
the competition ...if they start excluding the major clubs. ...they’ve 
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got to be careful ...this sector has attracted a huge amount of 
investment, there’s massive markets out there like ...China, the 
Far East, where there’s going to be massive monies coming in to 
the industry. UEFA will not want to exclude that. (auditor 2)
There are some clubs who – in my view – are so far away from 
being able to comply in the first year or so …, I worry that when 
UEFA draws up its list and says – you know, Big club x, Big club 
y etc. - you’re all not playing in Europe next season. The danger 
[is] that if there’s too many on that list, they get together and 
say, right UEFA, that’s fine, we can go and do our own thing and 
therefore the politics [will intervene] at that point in time. So my 
fear is - will it be implemented properly?  And then ultimately 
obviously, if it’s not implemented properly, it’s not working and 
excesses continue. (adviser 2)
What are they going to do if someone breaks it? Are they going 
to ban them from Europe for five years …? It would be stuck in 
the law courts for ever ...have the regulators got the money to 
fight this, let alone the backbone? [And] if they do fight it, certain 
fans will be up in arms; if they don’t, others will be up in arms! 
(adviser 3)
I think the big thing for UEFA will be how they police it and how 
then they punish clubs. There’s a lot of scepticism at the moment 
when you come to a big club, will they do anything? We’ve seen 
what they have done to Malaga1. Now, even when you mention the 
name Malaga, you always get the response from cynics of, yeah, 
but ...[what if] it was Real Madrid or Barcelona? (GBL 1)
FFP can perhaps best be described as an example of responsive regulation 
(Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992). Its development has been reliant on dialogue and 
engagement between the regulator and the clubs and hence the regulations 
assume a degree of goodwill on the parts of the regulatees (UEFA, 2013). More 
specifically the provisions in Annex XI and elsewhere give clubs every opportunity 
to comply with the rules. But at the same time UEFA has set out an enforcement 
pyramid, moving from advisory and persuasive measures at the bottom, mild 
administrative sanctions in the middle, through to punitive sanctions at the top (see 
Figure 5.1).
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Figure 5.1 UEFA FFP Enforcement Pyramid (UEFA, 2012c)
 
Removal of title 
Disqualification from 
competitions in progress 
and/or exclusion from 
future competitions 
Restriction on number of players a club 
may register for UEFA competitions1 
Prohibition on registering new players in UEFA 
competitions 
Withholding of revenues from UEFA competition 
Deduction of points 
Fine 
Reprimand 
Warning 
Note: 
1  Including a financial limit on the overall aggregate cost of the employee benefits expenses of players 
registered on the A list for the purposes of UEFA club competitions.
Under this type of regulation it is to be expected that UEFA would start at the 
bottom of the pyramid and assume virtue, that is assume clubs are willing to 
comply voluntarily (Gunningham, 2010). But where the assumption is misplaced, 
escalation up the enforcement pyramid will be necessary. Willingness to enforce the 
regulations is also important in terms of the message it sends to other regulatees 
and to avoiding accusations of unacceptable leniency by the regulator which could 
be interpreted as a form of regulatory capture, in turn undermining the regulatory 
system.
A particular concern around enforcement centred on the logic of using financial 
fines as penalties in a regulatory system designed to improve the financial capability 
of clubs. It was suggested by some interviewees that there was a risk that some 
clubs may see any fine as simply a fee worth paying (Sandel, 2012). For example: 
What happens if a club stands back and looks at it and says, well 
it is actually worth just ignoring the fine, taking the penalty? 
(auditor 1)
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At the same time, a risk of double jeopardy arising from the application of the 
regulations was also commented upon, i.e. where a club may be punished twice for 
the same offence.
[FFP] is slightly different because this is stopping you playing in 
a competition which has huge financial implications. You’ve got 
a club that’s struggling financially and you’re suddenly going to 
take away £10, 15, 20 million of revenue [from a club] that would 
otherwise qualify for the competition and that seems to go against 
the principles of what they’re trying to achieve. ...it’s crazy that 
...there’s a [financial] sanction when it’s all about financial fair 
play. (auditor 2)
In fact the risks of double jeopardy are compounded in that if a club does miss out 
on revenue through its failure to meet FFP criteria, the nature of the three year 
rolling break-even calculation means that the reduction in income it suffers will 
further reduce its chance of meeting the criteria next time round. Hence, there is a 
risk that FFP could be interpreted as contributing to an outcome precisely opposite 
to that which UEFA is seeking to achieve.
While there was backing for a regulatory system based upon, but not restricted 
to, clubs’ national financial statements, concerns were expressed around the 
challenges of regulating across international boundaries. For example:
...it’s going to be massively difficult to enforce across ...federations. 
That there will be different reporting standards, different cultures 
in terms of compliance. UEFA will find it ...very difficult to audit in 
certain countries. (club 1)
A key concern ...was to ensure that there is consistency across 
Europe. ...the Premier League has been campaigning a long time 
[for], to just make sure there is a level playing field in the way 
all these rules and regulations are interpreted across Europe and 
make sure that ...UEFA are doing a diligent job in auditing what’s 
going on in some of these other countries. (club 2)
You could see a situation where some countries [regulators] will 
go absolutely by the letter of the law and others might – just 
because of the way things have developed, take a more laissez-
faire approach. (auditor 4)
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Some interviewees also sought to extend concerns about the operation of a 
transnational system of financial regulation, to encompass wider macro-economic, 
fiscal and environmental issues. For example:
How do you apply it to Italy where most of the stadiums are 
owned by the local authority and ...[clubs get] a huge amount 
of support from the local authority?  I think [there is] a similar 
situation in Spain where there are a number of clubs outside the 
top ones who owe huge amounts to the local authorities, huge 
amounts of taxes owed. Again, how do you [deal with] that?  
(auditor 2)
UEFA’s view on this is quite straightforward: these types of factors, and others such 
as differential tax rates among countries, are environmental factors that are not the 
focus of the FFP regulations which are concerned solely with financial performance 
and position. What was reiterated was that the regulations are not designed to level 
the financial or sporting playing field, but rather to ensure financial fairness and 
financial discipline (interview with UEFA Benchmarking Manager). 
The issue of ‘principles versus rules’ has been debated often and at great length in 
the academic and professional literature and in practice over many years, with ICAS 
playing a prominent role  (ICAS, 2006; Weetman, 2006). In its report into principles 
in financial reporting, the Global Accounting Alliance (GAA, 2008) suggested that a 
different terminology should be adopted for principles-based standards; one which 
emphasised the way financial reporting standards should work. Adoption of such 
terminology as ‘outcome-based’ or ‘objectives-oriented’ has particular resonance 
for FFP given the explicit socio-economic objectives identified by UEFA in Articles 1 
and 2. But FFP regulations also contain a lot of detailed guidance; not least in terms 
of what constitutes relevant income and relevant expenses. Concern has already 
been expressed that clubs will adopt avoidance approaches to FFP, seeking to find 
loopholes in the rules, to comply with the letter of the FFP rules while violating 
their spirit (Drut and Raballand, 2011; Geey, 2011; Hamil and Walters, 2011; Müller 
et al., 2012). As is accepted in financial reporting as well as in taxation, rules and 
definitions for things like related parties and fair value, however well-intentioned, 
are productive sites for creative accounting (Jones, 2010). Examples of this 
already exist in football with evidence of creative accounting being used to facilitate 
positive licensing decisions in both German (Dietl and Frank, 2007) and Italian 
football (Morrow, 2006). Unsurprisingly the risks of creative accounting and the 
encouragement of an FFP avoidance industry were identified as potential problems.
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The problem is that with any rulebook there are so many ways to 
a) interpret it, and b) find routes round it. (auditor 1)
Any law that’s passed, the clever solicitors and accountants will 
find a way to circumvent it (legally, I hasten to add). ...I think big 
spending clubs will have invested some professional money to 
make sure they can use and abuse it as far as legally possible. 
(adviser 3)
…because of their complexity, [FFP] will inevitably have loopholes 
which will be open to exploitation and I think there’s a huge risk 
that ...when the rules start to bite ...that there will be endless 
expensive litigation either on the part of the clubs that are 
threatened with sanctions from UEFA or by clubs who feel that 
UEFA aren’t strictly applying sanctions to their competitors. (club 
1)
Ultimately if you wanted to [find] a way round the numbers, 
the only obvious way of doing it would be around related party 
transactions. So you then come back to – well, the numbers are 
what the numbers are – what are UEFA going to do about it? 
(auditor 5)
A number of interviewees broadened the discussion around creative accounting 
to encompass perceived concerns about UEFA’s capacity and competence around 
technical issues including the determination of fair value and substance versus form 
in respect of related party transactions, as well as related issues of enforcement 
(UEFA, 2012b, Annex X, E).
This is a potential nightmare! What is fair value? The simplistic 
view is that it is what someone is prepared to pay? But value can 
change very quickly, certainly in football - the transfer market 
shows us that all the time. (club 3)
I suppose they’re trying to exclude things that they don’t think are 
[recorded at] fair value, which is a very difficult measure because 
until the transaction [has] occurred, what becomes the fair value 
in the market place?  And things like sponsorship are changing all 
the time. The deal two years ago for one of the major clubs may 
have seemed quite high at the time but ...subsequent deals have 
shown, actually, that’s not as unfair as perhaps first [thought] and 
it just makes good press at the time. So what is fairness?  (auditor 
2)
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[That’s] the real concern ...[if] UEFA are unable to ...prove 
conclusively that elements of income are not truly third party 
transactions, then I think that would be a real shame. I wouldn’t 
envy their task of trying to establish those facts. (club 2)
I struggle to see without a mega army of auditors costing a huge 
amount of money they would get anywhere near being satisfied 
that the spirit of the rules, rather than the rules, are being adhered 
to. (club 1)
Are the sanctions enforceable and will UEFA try to enforce them? 
There’s then ...a grey area in terms of interpretation – it’s fairly 
clear in the rules about related party transactions – but how do 
you prove that some of these transactions are related and are not 
at market rates? (auditor 5)
Despite these concerns, however, confidence was expressed in the technical quality 
of the individuals appointed to the Investigatory and Adjudicatory Chambers of the 
CFCB,  (see Table 5.1), and in particular, on the independence of those bodies from 
UEFA itself (Dietl and Frank, 2007; Gouget, and Primault, 2006). 
One thing that looks sensible is …the CFCB …I think they are 
recruiting the right quality of people on that. …in terms of 
communication with the clubs …a commercial understanding of 
what clubs are doing; it’s not going to be just a black and white 
rules-based decision. It will actually be undertaken by …sensible, 
commercial, appropriate decision-makers who understand the 
commercial accounting, understand the financial reporting and 
therefore, that must over time create a very sensible financial fair 
play position. (auditor 2)
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Table 5.1 Membership and background of UEFA CFCB, December 2013
Investigatory Chamber
Jean-Luc Dehaene
Belgium 
Chief Investigator of CFCB
Former Prime Minister of Belgium
Jacobo Beltran
Spain
Member of Madrid Assembly
Brian Quinn
Scotland
Former Executive Director and Deputy Governor, The 
Bank of England
Egon Franck
Germany
Professor and Chair of Business Management, 
University of Zurich
Umberto Lago
Italy
Professor of Economics, University of Bologna
Petros Mavroidis
Greece
Professor of Law, European University Institute, 
Florence
Konstantin Sonin
Russia
Professor of Economics & Vice Rector, New Economic 
School, Moscow
Yves Wehrli
France
Lawyer and Managing Partner, Clifford Chance
Adjudicatory Chamber
Jose Narciso da Cunha 
Rodrigues
Portugal
Chairman  CFCB
Former Judge at the European Court of Justice
Louis Peila
Switzerland
Judge Cantonal, Court of Geneva
Christiaan Timmermans
Netherlands
Former Judge at the European Court of Justice
Charles Flint
England
Senior Barrister (Financial Regulation and Sports Law)
Adam Giersz
Poland
Former Sports Minister of Poland
UEFA itself believes that the risk of creative accounting has been overstated 
(interview with UEFA Benchmarking Manager). It points out that a great deal of 
creative accounting is balance sheet focused (e.g. window dressing), while FFP 
is both profit and loss account-based and determined over a three-year rolling 
period. The example of impairment charges was used to illustrate this. Under 
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the FFP regulations there was a window in 2011 in which it would have been 
possible for clubs to increase the impairment charge on the intangible asset of 
player registrations, thus ensuring lower amortisation charges would be included 
in the initial break-even calculations (UEFA, 2012b, Annex VII, C.4(d)). However, 
analysis by UEFA indicated an impairment charge in 2011 across all clubs in its 
benchmarking report of approximately €100m; a rise from the previous year’s 
€67m, but not in the opinion of UEFA’s Benchmarking Manager, a particularly 
marked increase . 
Autonomy, investment and sporting competition
FFP is ostensibly a club-based approach to financial regulation, but one which 
in some instances reduces the freedom of clubs to take decisions that they may 
judge as being in their best organisational interests. For example, while FFP makes 
no judgement on the merits of particular ownership structures, the break-even 
requirement based upon a comparison of relevant income and expenses, does 
limit the opportunity for club owners to make ex-post contributions to cover losses 
or ex-ante contributions other than in respect of specified investment activities 
(Article 58(2); Annex X), as well as limiting their capacity to take on debt (Annex 
X; Müller et al., 2012). The break even measure also acts as an implicit salary cap, 
thus diminishing individual clubs’ operational control. FFP regulations also do not 
fully reflect the consequences of a league acting on occasion as the economic 
unit, and in particular the different approaches adopted by leagues to things like 
redistribution of league-wide income over which an individual club has little control. 
For example, the media rights redistribution model used in the EPL involves clubs 
making solidarity payments, most noticeably parachute payments to clubs which 
get relegated, but also league wide charitable contributions. Under FFP, individual 
clubs are not permitted to deduct any part of these payments in determining their 
break-even position. 
FFP is designed to encourage clubs to focus on longer term investment, in contrast 
to a business model which has seen every last £ or € of revenue - and often much 
more beside - expended on player salaries and transfer fees. Equity investment 
is permitted in the regulations, both in terms of the notion of acceptable deviation 
(UEFA, 2012b, Article 61 and Annex X, Part C) and where the investment is in 
respect of items excluded from the definition of relevant expenses (UEFA, 2012b, 
Article 58 and Annex X, Part C). Nevertheless, concerns were expressed that the 
regulations would still restrict new investment, something seen as counter-intuitive 
by several club interviewees, and potentially unenforceable:
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I find it quite strange that an industry would bring in a regulation 
that is essentially restricting investment coming into that industry. 
(club 1)
There is a risk that it may inhibit new investors coming along and 
putting money into football. (club 2)
If you’ve got a private company, then if you’re the majority 
shareholder and you want to put money into the club in whatever 
way, then why should you be restricted from doing that just 
because it’s football? (club 5)
But it may be that some of those wealthy benefactors say, well it’s 
my business [and] if I want to put...money in, where does it say in 
the Companies Act legislation that I can’t do? Where does it say a 
company has to make a profit? (auditor 5)
The FFP model could be seen as contributing to a loss of autonomy in that ‘we are 
being told how to run our businesses in terms of expenditure and that is unusual to 
say the least’ (club 2). More specifically, one club felt that FFP’s apparent focus only 
on negative consequences of owner investment (e.g. the impact on player salaries), 
provided a very partial view of the contribution made by such owners in areas like 
infrastructure and local economic benefits; a contribution that would not have been 
realised were it not able to be led by investment on the field of play. Beyond narrow 
self-interest, one club interviewee expressed uneasiness that FFP could act to stifle 
competition, protecting well-established clubs from being challenged by less well-
established clubs (Peeters and Szymanski, 2012; Vöpel, 2011):
…then that could impact on some clubs [which] have ambitions 
of growing rapidly because ...to grow rapidly, most people within 
football believe you need to build up a very, very good team, a 
strong team and that ...everything sort of drives off that... But 
to do that needs ...heavy investment in the playing squad and it 
would just not be possible under break-even. (club 2)
It will depend on where an individual club is in its ...life cycle... 
Clubs ...that have strong finances and are doing well...it’s not 
going be a stretch for them to meet the break-even requirements. 
Whereas another club, for whatever reasons - ownership issues 
in the past, not a strong enough balance sheet ...they are well 
behind where they need to be on that – does that put them at a 
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disadvantage going forward in terms of the things they have to 
do to get it on the right footing?  It puts them further behind. I can 
see some competitive issues here. (auditor 4)
One interpretation of UEFA’s FFP rules is that they are an attempt to minimise 
what may be perceived as a source of non-virtuous competitive balance, i.e. where 
an owner can apparently invest large sums of money in a club and buy success, 
in turn reducing wider acceptance of the integrity of the game (Lang, 2013). This 
discussion highlights the centrality of the nature of this economic activity and its 
participant organisations to FFP and regulation. Are football clubs organisations 
free to make independent, commercial and financing decisions as their directors, 
shareholders or members see fit, reaping the benefits or otherwise of those 
decisions? Or are these organisations that by their shared participation in leagues 
and other competitions have responsibilities to each other; that by their social 
nature have responsibilities to their stakeholders and to their communities? 
…ultimately what UEFA is saying is …we’re not telling you you’ve 
got to run your club this way, we’re telling you if you want to play 
in our competitions, you’ve got to run your club that way. (auditor 
3)
You [clubs] have the autonomy to spend money ...but be aware 
that if we believe that’s unfair in a European context, you won’t 
be allowed to play in Europe. [But] if getting reduced autonomy 
means reducing financial doping, bringing you back into a level 
playing field with the vast majority of other clubs, [then] I think 
that is a good thing ...[that] we’re taking away a bit of autonomy. 
(adviser 2)
Summary
Overall, what emerges from this chapter is a widespread acceptance of the 
rationale for enhanced financial regulation of football clubs, support for many of 
the specific regulations introduced by UEFA as well as concern over the possible 
impact of other regulations and their enforceability. In the following chapter, 
the implications of these regulations for football club financial reporting will be 
addressed.
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6.  IMPLICATIONS FOR FOOTBALL CLUB FINANCIAL 
REPORTING
Transparency and useful information
FFP has focused attention not only on the financial performance and position of 
clubs, but also on their financial reporting. Clubs must either provide required FFP 
information within their audited financial statements, or separately under agreed 
upon procedures, including a requirement for that information to be audited (UEFA, 
2012b, Article 47). Given the extra cost involved in this separate procedure, UEFA 
hopes that the majority of clubs will move towards transparent disclosure of the 
required information (interview with UEFA Benchmarking Manager). Indeed in its 
2011 Benchmarking Report, UEFA commented that ‘there is no doubt that club 
licensing has had a huge impact in improving overall transparency in football over 
the last ten years’ (UEFA, 2013, p. 8). 
Several issues emerge from this. Perhaps the most visible is that ostensibly a 
parallel performance measurement (the FFP result) will exist alongside conventional 
accounting performance measures. Given that increasing transparency is one of 
the FFP aims (UEFA, 2012b, Article 2, para. 2(a)), it is interesting that there are no 
plans to publish the FFP results for individual clubs, although presumably any club 
which fails the break-even test will be publicised in the same way as those which 
have failed the overdue payables measures (see, for example, UEFA 2012d). 
The merits of enhanced FFP-related disclosure were discussed with interviewees, 
and again a variety of views were forthcoming. Several were of the opinion that 
there was little benefit to clubs or stakeholders from providing further information in 
the annual report. For example:
No, it’s a separate situation; it’s a distraction for most clubs ... I 
mean, it’s another thing they have to comply with. (auditor 2)
It’s totally separate. ...clubs may wish to give that information 
themselves ...[but] ...it would be very difficult to single out a 
particular business sector like football clubs and say your financial 
reporting has got to be different ...they’re not a regulated business 
like banks or insurance companies and I don’t see why they should 
be. (auditor 5)
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All you [would] find out about is the youth development 
expenditure which will be broadly similar across [leagues] ...the 
infrastructure is in the P&L anyway. (club 1)
In contrast, one interviewee expressed concern about the creation of a parallel 
performance measure, in particular, the lack of disclosure and transparent 
reconciliation to the results in a club’s financial statements:
…the FFP result will be very difficult to correlate to anything that’s 
in the financial statements. ...[It] would be interesting ...[if] the Fair 
Play calculation became available ...But why not make it a public 
document ...each club’s calculation? (adviser 2)
It is also something of a paradox that there will be no disclosure of the adjustments 
between the two measures (as exists, for example, between statutory and 
regulatory accounts for utility companies), when for many stakeholders it is 
precisely in areas like community engagement and longer term facility and youth 
investment that a particular interest might be anticipated. The feasibility of providing 
such reconciliation, as well as its potential for encouraging best practice in the field 
was noted by one of the interviewees:
…if the Fair Play returns were generally made public ...I suspect 
that [clubs] will develop a communication-based [tool] ...our 
income statement in our published accounts shows that we’ve 
lost £50 million and yet we’re still competing in the Champions’ 
League. So how do we get from one to the other? …I guess it 
would start by being done in a sort of narrative way. We comply 
with FFP as described by UEFA because the adjustments in 
respect of youth, community [etc.] are such that we adhere to the 
rules. And that might then develop into as noted above, we spent 
£7 million ...on youth activities last year [and here] is how we 
spent it. ...[Clubs] would take this on cautiously, [there would be a] 
temptation to do the bare minimum, but one or two clubs may be 
bolder and say actually here are the adjustments, you can see from 
the adjustments that it’s because we’re doing these good things. 
(auditor 3)
The idea of encouraging best practice in this way has similarities with informational 
regulation, where information on the operation and behaviour of regulated entities 
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is provided to stakeholders, in anticipation of stakeholders applying pressure, where 
necessary, to comply with regulations which serve the interests of stakeholders 
(Gunningham, 2002). Most commonly this type of regulation has focused on 
environmental activities and is targeted at large enterprises, in particular public 
companies which are vulnerable to investor reaction. However, the very public 
nature of football and media  scrutiny thereof,  taken together with the dynamism 
of some football communities, may make this a powerful form of regulation. 
Enhanced disclosure may act to energise groups like supporters certainly, but also 
perhaps stakeholders like media organisations through raising public awareness, 
to pressurise clubs into acting to take the necessary steps to comply with FFP, in 
cognisance of their responsibilities to other clubs and to their own stakeholders.
Broader forms of reporting
Weaknesses identified in conventional financial reporting, coupled with the 
requirements to submit bespoke FFP information, provided the context for a more 
expansive discussion of reporting on and about the distinct organisations that are 
professional football clubs. 
Over the last couple of decades there has been increased interest in accountants 
seeking to broaden the scope of accounts beyond something that is exclusively 
economic in content, searching for ways in which organisations can be held 
accountable for a broader range of activities and to a broader range of actors 
(see, for example, Arrington and Francis, 1993; Gray, 2001).There now exists a 
substantial body of literature around what is termed social accounting, externally 
prepared accounts of institutional activity or intentions which seek to discharge an 
organisation’s accountability to its stakeholders. 
In the wider economy there is considerable interest in the evolution of 
corporate reporting, and in opportunities to provide broader and more inclusive 
communication about how organisations operate and are governed and about how 
this leads to value creation (ICAS, 2012; IIRC, 2013, 2011). Central to concepts 
like Integrated Reporting <IR> is an appreciation of the various capitals – financial, 
manufactured, intellectual, social and relationship – that an organisation uses and 
develops in its value creation activities (IIRC, 2013). Value in this context manifests 
itself not simply in financial returns, but also in positive and negative effects on 
other capital and other stakeholders (IIRC, 2013). The very nature of professional 
football means that there are unambiguous and necessary relationships between 
participant clubs within competitions, these encompassing financial, sporting and 
at times, social dimensions. Football clubs can be viewed as cooperative activities: 
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activities that rely on the coming together of financial, human and social capitals 
(Morrow, 2003). While the IIRC’s focus is on investors, nevertheless there is a 
great deal in its ambitions for reporting that may have relevance for football in the 
context of its regulatory developments. The emphasis attached to the context within 
which organisations operate is an important feature of FFP and is an essential 
factor in understanding the behaviour of clubs and their stakeholders. The desire 
to harmonise reporting frameworks, both regulatory and market, is certainly of 
interest given the divergence between FFP and conventional financial reporting and 
the apparent weaknesses of the existing model of financial reporting in terms of 
satisfying user needs. The importance of human and social capital and relationships 
in football clubs, most notably in the form of clubs’ playing staff and supporter 
relationships, are fundamental to the value of a football club. Interdependencies, 
albeit between distinct organisational units, are also central to the success of 
individual units and to leagues, and to ensuring the integrity of competitions.
Some interviewees acknowledged an opportunity for improved promotion and 
accountability given the multi-faceted contributions made by clubs in so many 
different areas. For example: 
 [Broader information on the social role of the club] is something 
that should be out there for fans and everybody to see what we 
are doing. That should impact on the club in the longer term, as 
well as let people see that we’re investing for the future and that 
we don’t have a short-term philosophy. (club 4)
…one of the things we do is encourage firms to think about their 
total tax contribution ...maybe there’s something there about 
disclosing …[a club’s] total football contribution? Yes, you’ve got 
a team out on the park in that particular league and that’s very 
relevant in terms of where you come in the table ...[But] let’s 
just talk about what more you have done for the wider football 
community in terms of youth development, supporting kids ...[all 
that] other stuff. What is the financial measure of a football club’s 
contribution to society? (adviser 1)
One of the club interviewees recognised the potential for a distinct report, separate 
from but complementing the annual financial report (club 3). As well as providing a 
mechanism to promote the club’s broader activities and role, more instrumentally 
it was suggested that the report could also contribute to developing the club’s 
relationship with social and political agencies, facilitating a move to enhanced 
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partnership working. Another introduced the possibility and desirability of a SORP 
for football reporting akin to that for charity reporting:
I can see an argument that says ...these businesses are not simply 
about the shareholders, suppliers etc. There’s a much wider public 
interest because you’ve got this huge fan base and it’s a big part of 
the social fabric of a neighbourhood and ...that dictates that there 
should be a requirement for additional disclosures. (auditor 4)
The International <IR> Framework consultation draft provides guidance on the 
preparation and presentation of integrated reports (IIRC, 2013). However, it is clear 
that the reports are expected to be flexible and organisation specific. Given the 
diversity of football clubs’ ownership and governance structures, as well as the 
activities they engage in beyond the pitch, this bespoke approach would seem to be 
appropriate for clubs. The one interviewee (adviser 2) who commented specifically 
on this, however, offered a different view, suggesting that any move towards 
broader reporting in football would benefit from being coordinated or lead by 
UEFA or by national associations, and hence building on the success of initiatives 
like the UEFA Benchmarking Report (UEFA, 2013). Some interviewees, however, 
raised concerns about commercial confidentiality in terms of broader disclosure, 
encompassing both generic and football-specific concerns, the latter reflecting the 
peculiar nature of competition and co-operation inherent in football leagues:
…to a certain extent, there might be nervousness …why some of 
the clubs wouldn’t want to sign up to this. I’m just thinking of an 
example of a club [which] is in a bit of difficulty but managing to 
trade away. If they were to give a whole lot of information that 
potential suppliers could see, [which might show that] actually 
they’re in more financial difficulty than we appreciated from the 
financial statements, it could lead to problems with suppliers not 
wanting to trade with that entity. (adviser 2)
…traditionally many [clubs] have been quite secretive and they do 
like to try and keep as many things from other clubs as they can 
possibly get away with. (club 2)
[But] there’s all sorts of trade-offs there …between the owners and 
what the owners might feel they want to disclose, how open they 
want to be; and what their fans would want. (auditor 4)
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The latter two quotes reinforce concerns articulated about the usefulness of existing 
financial statements, and specifically the risk of a disconnect between the type of 
information disclosed and that which stakeholders might actually wish to see. The 
first point reminds us that so much of the narrative surrounding the business of 
football in recent years had tended to focus on its negative aspects. Central to <IR> 
is the desire to provide broader communication about what organisations do and 
how they operate. Hence, an approach like <IR> would require an entirely different 
mind-set to be adopted, not just by clubs and directors, but also by key stakeholders 
like supporters and those who mediate between clubs and their supporters, notably 
the media, about what makes a football club valuable and about the importance of 
improved accountability. One interviewee was entirely unconvinced that the broader 
social and community activities and role of clubs was of interest to more than a 
very small number of dedicated fans (adviser 3). In the opinion of one of the club 
interviewees, irrespective of what clubs did, innovative moves towards broader 
forms of reporting would be reliant on changed behaviour within the football media:
The Premier League [is] a massive revenue generator for the 
Exchequer …in terms of PAYE, VAT, National Insurance …business 
rates. And yet it’s not given the credit its due for that. …I think 
[the] CSR projects that football does are absolutely fantastic. …
We do massive amounts of good and [if] you multiply that across 
the [leagues] there’s a huge amount of good done. But ...you look 
at the papers and wonder! ... The problem is the press are much 
more interested in the bad news stories. (club 1)
Summary
Overall, interviewee opinions as to whether the introduction of FFP was likely 
to have implications for football club financial reporting were something of a 
dichotomy. Some interviewees saw FFP as simply a necessary regulatory process 
and as such unlikely to have any discernible impact on clubs’ financial reporting; 
others, believed that financial consequences of FFP coupled with broader interest 
therein could result in it being a first step towards enhanced disclosure. However, 
the possibility that FFP might act as a catalyst for broader football club reporting, 
with greater emphasis on the multi-faceted nature of football clubs’ contribution 
and value and on providing improved accountability to stakeholders, was not widely 
supported by the interviewees. 
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7. CONCLUSIONS
UEFA’s FFP regulations, a combination of high level principles and detailed rules in 
which ensuring the sustainability of the European football sector is central, become 
effective from season 2013/14. Driven by the apparent absurdity of increasingly 
prevalent losses and escalating debts among major clubs at a time when revenues 
within the industry continue to show rapid growth, through its FFP regulations 
UEFA is seeking to provide a framework within which clubs are encouraged to: 
•	 reflect	on	their	financial	management;	
•	 adopt	a	longer-term	perspective	in	decision-making;	and	
•	 recognise	the	implications	of	their	financial	behaviour	on	other	clubs	and	on	their	
various publics. 
Since the concept of FFP was first advocated, UEFA’s commitment thereto has 
become ever more apparent in the resources it has devoted to the project in-house, 
its prominence in external promotion and communication, and in the quality of 
individuals it has invited to oversee the independent investigation and adjudication 
procedures associated with the regulations. 
Drawing on professional opinion this research project had two broad objectives: 
firstly, to critically review the requirements set out in UEFA’s FFP regulations; and 
secondly, to consider the implications arising out of FFP for football club financial 
reporting now and in the future. The distinct nature of the football industry and its 
clubs mean that there is disproportionate interest in the finances of professional 
football clubs. The opportunity to draw on the opinions of professional accountants 
and others with experience of working in and around the business side of football 
clubs in this research has provided a critical appraisal of FFP and of its possible 
implications. It has also contributed to debates about the role and effectiveness 
of conventional financial reporting and of alternative and broader reporting and 
accountability frameworks. A number of key findings, discussed in detail below, 
emerge from this research and lead to several policy recommendations.
The requirements set out in UEFA’s FFP regulations 
Among those interviewed there was widespread acceptance of: the specificities of 
the business of football; the existence of a financial problem in professional football; 
and the need for some form of financial regulation therein. In addition there was 
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broad acceptance of the approach adopted by UEFA, including the rolling average 
break-even model which was seen to militate against the uncertainties of seasonal 
playing performance and its financial consequences. The determination of relevant 
income and relevant costs was welcomed by many interviewees as a way of 
encouraging or incentivising long-term planning and decision-making by clubs.
While indirect measures such as enhanced monitoring of overdue payables were 
universally welcomed, a major concern expressed by many interviewees was the 
lack of direct emphasis on cash and on its use and generation. This was seen 
as surprising, given the fundamental importance of cash in this industry and the 
number of clubs in respect of which auditors have regularly expressed concern 
about the validity of the going concern assumption. Widespread concerns were 
also expressed about the risks of creative accounting and the encouragement of an 
FFP avoidance industry, due to the use of rules in the regulations, these focusing in 
particular on the determination of fair value and substance versus form in respect 
of related party transactions. UEFA’s capacity and competence around technical 
matters and the related enforcement was also raised as a potential issue. Concern 
was also expressed that the regulations may limit new investment coming into 
clubs.
The dual nature of professional football clubs - part business, part social 
institution - means that FFP is perhaps best described as a form of public 
interest or social regulation. For social regulation to be successful, effective 
enforcement is necessary (Gunningham, 2010). FFP is an example of responsive 
regulation, where a great deal of emphasis is placed on dialogue and engagement 
between the regulator, the clubs and other key stakeholders (UEFA, 2013, 3; 
9). This approach allows the regulator to begin by assuming willing compliance 
on the part of the regulatees and to respond with co-operative measures, only 
escalating to more punitive or coercive strategies where expectations are not 
met (Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992; Gunningham, 2010). The challenge for UEFA, 
and one commented on by all interviewees, is to find the correct balance 
between cooperation, persuasion and enforcement. As UEFA itself has noted, 
notwithstanding the involvement of the UEFA family in approving the FFP concept, 
the real challenge now is for all football’s stakeholders to prove that they are 
willing to act together to achieve its objectives (UEFA, 2013, 9). But in practice it 
is unlikely that the entire family can or will act together: the economic structure of 
professional football coupled with the objectives of some clubs and some owners 
lead one to conclude that not all clubs are rational actors capable of responding to 
incentives. Hence, enforcement of the regulations becomes ever more crucial. 
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On this, concern was raised about the logic of using financial penalties in a 
regulatory system designed to improve the financial capability of clubs. Moreover, 
if a club was to be denied the opportunity to participate in one of UEFA’s club 
competitions, concerns were expressed about the iterative or cumulative 
consequences of that decision. That is, fears were expressed that the resultant 
diminution in a club’s income would further reduce the likelihood of it achieving 
the FFP criteria in subsequent years. Hence, inadvertently FFP could actually 
contribute to making some clubs less financially sustainable. 
As UEFA reviews the implementation and effectiveness of FFP, it is recommended 
that: 
•	 Greater	consideration	be	afforded	in	the	regulations	to	cash	control	measures.	
•	 FFP	enforcement	sanctions	adopted	are	not	financial	in	nature.
•	 Further	consideration	is	given	as	to	how	UEFA	might	amend	its	regulations	to	
avoid a sanctioned club suffering a form of double jeopardy.
Current and future football club financial reporting: The 
implications of FFP
The characteristics of the football industry - the inter-dependence of clubs, their 
social significance and community imbeddedness - mean that its nature cannot be 
fully captured by conventional accounting or finance (Morrow, 2003; Storm and 
Nielsen, 2012). For example, experiences of clubs in financial distress demonstrate 
emphatically that these organisations are not treated by society as mere 
businesses, judged by conventional measures of return, and allowed to flourish or 
fail simply on the basis of these accepted measures of business success. These 
are organisations where non-financial issues are as, if not more, important than 
financial ones – they are too big to fail not in financial terms, but in social terms 
(Storm and Nielsen, 2012).
In business terms, the majority of football clubs are relatively simple and relatively 
small business organisations and for the most part accounting for and reporting on 
their activities is uncomplicated. But FFP has shone a light not only on weaknesses 
of the business behaviour of some clubs, but also on inadequacies in their financial 
reporting. Evidence from this study suggests that financial reporting in football 
clubs is compliance driven; a statutory necessity providing some limited assurance 
to users like suppliers, lenders and governing bodies/leagues, but offering little 
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meaningful disclosure on key performance indicators like salary costs and little 
evident benefit in terms of decision-making and wider accountability. Interestingly 
some interviewees did not see this as problematic, suggesting that football club 
financial reporting is no more or less useful than financial reporting in other sectors 
of the economy. However, an alternative interpretation is that presently financial 
reporting and by extension the accounting profession is complicit in failing to 
enhance meaningful understanding of the behaviour, performance and value of 
these unusual organisations. 
The FFP break-even result is a key determinant in whether a particular club is 
licenced to participate in lucrative UEFA club competitions. Although improved 
transparency is one of UEFA’s aims, to date it has not proposed club-level 
disclosure of FFP information or of the FFP break-even result. Hence, there is no 
evident intention on the governing body’s part that FFP be seen as a movement 
towards purpose-oriented reporting at the level of individual clubs. There was 
no consensus among interviewees as to whether FFP has implications for clubs’ 
financial reporting, but given its financial consequences, the licensing decision itself 
will be of significance to all of a football club’s stakeholders. Thus, the financial 
consequences of any breach of the FFP break-even test, coupled with the attention 
already afforded to the regulatory initiative by the media and by supporters, may in 
time result in pressure for enhanced disclosure and accountability.
By focusing attention on longer-term time horizons, the inter-dependence of clubs 
and the social and political context within which professional football takes place, 
FFP has drawn attention to the limitations of relying solely on conventional financial 
performance indicators in respect of football clubs. Moreover, having extended 
the notion of what constitutes football club performance through the definitions of 
relevant income and cost, FFP may also in time act as a catalyst for broader and 
more inclusive reporting, in which the contribution made by clubs and the demands 
for accountability beyond mere financial accountability are more visibly considered. 
While the primary focus of integrated reporting <IR> is on investors, nevertheless 
there is much in the aims and ambitions of the IIRC initiative for reporting that has 
relevance for distinct organisations like football clubs. In particular, the importance 
of human and social capital and relationships in clubs and the contribution these 
make to their value, offer a fascinating site in which to experiment with the 
preparation of an integrated report. However, while that may be seen as desirable 
by many football stakeholders, given the reluctance of several clubs to engage in 
this project and in a generic discussion around reporting now and in future, it is 
questionable how enthusiastically it would be received by many clubs. 
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It is recommended that:
•	 Research	is	undertaken	into	the	merits	and	demerits	of	introducing	bespoke	
financial reporting for football clubs, taking into consideration the distinct nature 
of football club organisations and their stakeholders.
•	 As	FFP	break-even	regulations	begin	to	take	effect,	consideration	is	given	by	
UEFA, leading European clubs and their advisers to the benefits of disclosing 
the FFP break-even measure and to requiring clubs to provide a reconciliation 
between it and reported profit/(loss). As well as providing enhanced disclosure, 
this would lessen the risk of stakeholders being misled by differences between 
FFP break-even and ‘actual’ financial viability. 
•	 That	IIRC,	ICAS	and	other	interested	parties	seek	to	identify	a	leading	football	
club willing to participate in an integrated reporting pilot/case study.

63 FINANCIAL FAIR PLAY - IMPLICATIONS FOR FOOTBALL CLUB FINANCIAL REPORTING
ENDNOTES
1 The Spanish club, Malaga, was banned by UEFA for two years in December 
2012 because of overdue payments to rival clubs and to the Spanish tax 
authorities. That was subsequently reduced to a year after the club regularised 
its overdue payables. The club unsuccessfully appealed to the Court of 
Arbitration for Sport to have the decision annulled or replaced with less severe 
sanctions (BBC, 2013).
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Football activities, both on and off the pitch, are often hitting our news. Despite 
remarkable revenue growth we have seen numerous well known clubs facing an 
escalation of player costs, unsustainable debt and clubs suffering financial difficulties, 
sometimes leading to insolvency proceedings.  This has resulted in European football’s 
governing body – UEFA – taking action and introducing Financial Fair Play (FFP) 
regulations. These regulations are designed to encourage clubs to adopt a more 
economically rational and sustainable approach to their activities.  But will these 
regulations work and what is the impact on financial reporting for clubs – is the current 
framework fit for purpose?
This report seeks to address these issues through a series of interviews with 
finance directors at football clubs, football club auditors, football finance experts and 
representatives of governing bodies and leagues.
The new regulations, effective for 2013/14, essentially require clubs ‘playing in Europe’ to 
report a break-even position, over a rolling period but based on what is termed ‘relevant’ 
income and costs. Whilst the findings of this study are largely supportive of UEFA’s 
objectives, a number of specific concerns are raised and recommendations made to 
UEFA. In addition, the current financial statements produced by clubs were seen as of 
little or no use, and there was little agreement amongst the interviewees as to whether 
this would change as a result of FFP.  
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